I don't know if anything will come of this, nor will I be able to articulate myself properly. I've recently had thoughts pertaining to the manner of strengthening relationships, contributing to society and the requirements for being able to do both. Now, I should like to preface saying that I am in no measure a good analyst for the inner workings of the mind; since my experience is limited, I will naturally be inclined to produce a more theoretical explication which goes in line with my dislike of particularism, which is to say that I'd like to define the concept of personality through the general terms which are clearest to me. This can be seen as a brash formalism, but no matter.
My thesis is this: personality is deterministic. Personality is a highly complex thing, which would normally make our inquiry far too general to ever be conducive to any substantive procedure. In light of this, I propose to limit the scope of our inquiry to a particular domain of discourse, that of how we apply reference. My definition is this: personality consist of a set of observable preferences of how an individual may act in a given situation, according to the attribution of these preferences by independent observers to individuals exposed to non-trivial or trivial outcomes.
Now, the locus of this definition consists in a substantive commitment to a particular course of action, dependent upon the preferences of the individual. But there is a certain ambiguity in this, for these attributes, by our definition, must be assigned; for if we do not assign them, we can assume that the features are either independent of the scenario or inarticulable. The requirement that we have independent observers to root our reference in something material complicates things.
For one, we now have to account for the manner in which we tie articulable descriptions to the ephemeral realms of experience. For instance, to witness someone becoming infuriated with something arbitrary may be pinned down as an "ill-tempered" or "bellicose" attitude, according as the reaction is taken to be improportionate to the impetus. The difference here is the weight in which the action holds in this scenario, as may be seen in cultural miscommunication, with certain practices common to the one being absurd to the other. This in itself could be articulated in the other culture as some quintessentially "Western" attribute, and thus characteristic of a difference of habit; this can be seen by some as an eccentricity, which itself manifests as an attribute.
Now, we should not neglect that our definition lacks in generality. Of course there are scenarios in which outcomes are unimportant, such as when we identify the preferences of a speaker in conversation, or even prejudge the preferences of another by their appearance. I should like to answer that my intent is to divorce aesthetics from personality and, moreover, tie it to something more fundamental about social integration, in particular the desiderata of traits which are esteemed in society; this ties in to my investigation of wants, which has been covered in another thread of mine.
The determinism of personality is just the claim that we cannot choose which attributes are assigned to us, or at least that our role in trying to conform to such behaviours is arbitrary, and determined by a greater number of things. The law of indeterminacy states that the attributes we assign through our interpretation of outcomes do not exist in a vacuum: that we require observers, whose ideas of reference are quite distinct from ours, means that we rely simply on associations built up from experience, and nothing more. The question is to whether or not these are at all accurate; and even if they are, do we consider them consistent with the actual qualities which give rise to certain behaviours?
That is, whether or not these attributes are representative of a true state of affairs rests upon the clarity with which an independent observer can make a sense connection; and this itself arises from an interminable habit of the mind, mainly to assign features to things which normally do not intrinsically possess that quality.
I mean to try to construct the thesis that our habits are those dependent upon independent observers; habits which are constructed from the interplay of experience (the is) and wants (the ought). Experience creates referential pathways in which some family resemblance is identified within a set of articulable preferences. I say 'articulable' preferences, since these are most immediate the speaker, and consequently provide the clearest impression upon them. I'd like to first establish what I call a subordinate chain of attributes; we distinguish between internal and external traits, a distinction which is made clear in the common sense impression of personality typologies.
In a subordinate chain, we have first internal attributes which indicate the manner of apprehension that an individual may have in a particular scenario, and second the external attributes which arise from outcomes gained through application of the first: so, for instance, we may consider 'melancholy' as an internal trait, while 'slovenness' can be considered an external one; we will say that "their slovenness is a product of their melancholy," though not necessarily the converse, though "their melancholy is a product of their slovenness" would also be a valid distinction, carrying a different connotation. But the information which is external and dependent of these attributions does not change; the difference in the two is just the manner of constructing these facts in language. In any case, we rarely apply subordinate chains in our reasoning of preferences; but the distinction is there, from which it bleeds into all preconceptions of the nature of the individuals.
This is where the difficulty arises, and perhaps reinforces the law of indeterminacy in assigning attributes. We have no consistent way of distinguishing between the two, and in fact are in no general agreement upon what constitutes an internal attribute; this would even tend toward the political, in consideration of 'slovenness' as an innate quality, which might be used to voice certain patterns of rhetoric, in particular of oppressive factions which should like to conflate the determinism of personality with that of biology. The difference consists in the identification of preference to a non-trivial or trivial event, whether that be indicators which consistently show that an individual procrastinates or perceiving their appearance to be unkempt. These in general are habits of assigning a family resemblance from experience, of which can in fact make use of subordinate chains in clarifying these realms of experience.
If external attributes are derived from internal ones, then internal attributes, in general, give rise to an attribution of preferences; these internal attributes partially derive from our interpretation of past outcomes, from which we either receive social acceptance or social animus, depending on the locus of their effects. Now, to quickly cover independent and dependent wants, dependent wants are desires or expectations for relationships which are inherited from ideas dependent upon the communities which we live in; on a global level, we can define this as the social contract, and on a local level as the standards of conduct embodied by the community. Independent wants are those which are determined by internal attributes i.e desires which aren't consistent with a dependent want, and consequently not being strictly rational. The desire to move in higher social circles is itself an independent want; or the desire to be the funniest in a group of friends, and so on. Global independent wants are essentially local dependent wants, and local independent wants is a tautology.
Now, the indeterminacy of internal attributes is conducive to the claim that "anything that drives personality is sure to rest on things inarticulable," which is to say that the cycle of giving voice to desire is largely indeterminate, according to our law of indeterminacy. To make an attribute articulate is to give weight to a sense impression, thereby entailing that we can act upon it, according to the attribution of preference to any particular action, from which certain attributes may be assigned thereto. That is, if I want to be seen as indifferent, I may make certain preferences in my actions more explicit, or in any case features which can be assigned a particular quality or attribute, of which hopefully will align with my own view of indifference. This want can be compelled by any number of things, and arises from an indescribable internal attribute for which it will bleed into many of my actions.
Say I want to become an individual who has an affable personality. I can conceive of the logical step in pursuing this want, perhaps understanding that affability consists in proactively engaging in discussion, feigning certain attitudes, etc., all of which amount to the part of internal attributes influencing my behaviour; yet the indeterminacy of internal attributes means that our choice over what preferences we should develop, in conjunction with what attributes are assigned to us from independent observers, rests on the strength with which the desirability of a certain outcome has in our mind, which is ultimately determined by any number of inarticulable internal attributes, and thus outside of our control. The logical step is reasonable, yet it requires something that is not intrinsic to my nature, nor experience.
So, the building of independent wants, which forms of bolus of 'personality' in individuals, derives from previous non-trivial outcomes which indicate the amount of acceptance/stigmatization that arises from adopting certain sets of attributes. In other words, we can attempt to shape and articulate our personality according to global and local interests, so long as we produce effective outcomes which align with our own desires. But this seems circular: since these desires are essentially reducible to differences in internal attributes, which arise from what I described above, it seems that the shaping of internal attributes is dependent on global and local interests, and thus not a consequence of our own will.
Now the question that arises is whether or not we can be held culpable for our own actions, since if they are determined by an inarticulate web of internal attributes that derive in part from experience, how can we be said to have choice over our preferences? Well, we can simply state that our understanding of personality ought to be distinct from any moral system; we can hold certain moral positions, and offer great moralistic riposte to any amoral claim: yet this arises from a difference in internal attributes, and consequently the whole chief claim to moralism is made inarticulate, and hence functionally useless in practice. In any case, who attribution of an individual as 'moral' is enigmatic at best, offering up, not a moral distinction, but an observation of a form of conduct which aligns with an independent observer: and this observation must be rooted in their own moral ideas, or perhaps according to what they perceive as normative or anarchic in the world.
There can be seen some general agreement in Marx, as characterised by "false consciousness," a term not explicitly used by him but nonetheless held as indicative of his own thoughts, that the working class may develop cognitive confusions as concealment of social contradictions, and that these are inherited from the capitalistic system which works against their own interests. Now, the agreement consists in perpetuating unsound expectations, which we are all complicit in, in favour of social hegemony. In particular, I think this defines the differences between the sexes rather well; and we can lazily compound our discourse with terms like "social constructs," which may be true but sounds misleading. We are consigned to these constructs in the very same way that we are consigned to a particular system of law; the independence of judiciary and the ideal of law as a separation of powers is self-regulatory in a sense, and the same can be said of social constructs, which can be represented as global wants manifest from the locale of internal attributes.
I disagree in that wants can be so reductive; after all, to purport that individuals should work in interests intuitively best for them is to describe an inarticulable desire for people to act in a way according to your own internal attributes: that is, the idea that independent observers determine self-interest in favour of the working class seems to me wrong. In any case, we are not in a position to determine what interests are best for an individual, even if we recognize that their current interests, perhaps, are not the greatest.
There is certainly a lot that I missed and should in future like to work on. In particular, the nature of assigning reference seems to me an error or representing the act of assigning weight to thought. I may have certain ideas of how thoughts operate, though this could possibly be affirmed by my own distinct representation with which my mind gives weight; and this can be altered, of course, by semantic loopholes, which may form an incredulous (or false) idea of my own mind. But that's mere posturing, and thus has no place in the plane of effects.
To put a controversial spin on the topic: are incels really capable of developing socially desirable qualities? My answer seems to be NO, that manufacturing social desirable attributes can be attempted in practice, but never fully committed to as a consequence of the law of indeterminacy; the logical step in evolving or achieving 'ascension' is clear, but the ability to actually make that leap must rely on internal attributes. I'll end there, since I don't wish to make any moral distinction in matters of character.
TL;DR personality is deterministic, traits are indeterminate. I may have missed a lot, but the general premise is clear.
My thesis is this: personality is deterministic. Personality is a highly complex thing, which would normally make our inquiry far too general to ever be conducive to any substantive procedure. In light of this, I propose to limit the scope of our inquiry to a particular domain of discourse, that of how we apply reference. My definition is this: personality consist of a set of observable preferences of how an individual may act in a given situation, according to the attribution of these preferences by independent observers to individuals exposed to non-trivial or trivial outcomes.
Now, the locus of this definition consists in a substantive commitment to a particular course of action, dependent upon the preferences of the individual. But there is a certain ambiguity in this, for these attributes, by our definition, must be assigned; for if we do not assign them, we can assume that the features are either independent of the scenario or inarticulable. The requirement that we have independent observers to root our reference in something material complicates things.
For one, we now have to account for the manner in which we tie articulable descriptions to the ephemeral realms of experience. For instance, to witness someone becoming infuriated with something arbitrary may be pinned down as an "ill-tempered" or "bellicose" attitude, according as the reaction is taken to be improportionate to the impetus. The difference here is the weight in which the action holds in this scenario, as may be seen in cultural miscommunication, with certain practices common to the one being absurd to the other. This in itself could be articulated in the other culture as some quintessentially "Western" attribute, and thus characteristic of a difference of habit; this can be seen by some as an eccentricity, which itself manifests as an attribute.
Now, we should not neglect that our definition lacks in generality. Of course there are scenarios in which outcomes are unimportant, such as when we identify the preferences of a speaker in conversation, or even prejudge the preferences of another by their appearance. I should like to answer that my intent is to divorce aesthetics from personality and, moreover, tie it to something more fundamental about social integration, in particular the desiderata of traits which are esteemed in society; this ties in to my investigation of wants, which has been covered in another thread of mine.
The determinism of personality is just the claim that we cannot choose which attributes are assigned to us, or at least that our role in trying to conform to such behaviours is arbitrary, and determined by a greater number of things. The law of indeterminacy states that the attributes we assign through our interpretation of outcomes do not exist in a vacuum: that we require observers, whose ideas of reference are quite distinct from ours, means that we rely simply on associations built up from experience, and nothing more. The question is to whether or not these are at all accurate; and even if they are, do we consider them consistent with the actual qualities which give rise to certain behaviours?
That is, whether or not these attributes are representative of a true state of affairs rests upon the clarity with which an independent observer can make a sense connection; and this itself arises from an interminable habit of the mind, mainly to assign features to things which normally do not intrinsically possess that quality.
I mean to try to construct the thesis that our habits are those dependent upon independent observers; habits which are constructed from the interplay of experience (the is) and wants (the ought). Experience creates referential pathways in which some family resemblance is identified within a set of articulable preferences. I say 'articulable' preferences, since these are most immediate the speaker, and consequently provide the clearest impression upon them. I'd like to first establish what I call a subordinate chain of attributes; we distinguish between internal and external traits, a distinction which is made clear in the common sense impression of personality typologies.
In a subordinate chain, we have first internal attributes which indicate the manner of apprehension that an individual may have in a particular scenario, and second the external attributes which arise from outcomes gained through application of the first: so, for instance, we may consider 'melancholy' as an internal trait, while 'slovenness' can be considered an external one; we will say that "their slovenness is a product of their melancholy," though not necessarily the converse, though "their melancholy is a product of their slovenness" would also be a valid distinction, carrying a different connotation. But the information which is external and dependent of these attributions does not change; the difference in the two is just the manner of constructing these facts in language. In any case, we rarely apply subordinate chains in our reasoning of preferences; but the distinction is there, from which it bleeds into all preconceptions of the nature of the individuals.
This is where the difficulty arises, and perhaps reinforces the law of indeterminacy in assigning attributes. We have no consistent way of distinguishing between the two, and in fact are in no general agreement upon what constitutes an internal attribute; this would even tend toward the political, in consideration of 'slovenness' as an innate quality, which might be used to voice certain patterns of rhetoric, in particular of oppressive factions which should like to conflate the determinism of personality with that of biology. The difference consists in the identification of preference to a non-trivial or trivial event, whether that be indicators which consistently show that an individual procrastinates or perceiving their appearance to be unkempt. These in general are habits of assigning a family resemblance from experience, of which can in fact make use of subordinate chains in clarifying these realms of experience.
If external attributes are derived from internal ones, then internal attributes, in general, give rise to an attribution of preferences; these internal attributes partially derive from our interpretation of past outcomes, from which we either receive social acceptance or social animus, depending on the locus of their effects. Now, to quickly cover independent and dependent wants, dependent wants are desires or expectations for relationships which are inherited from ideas dependent upon the communities which we live in; on a global level, we can define this as the social contract, and on a local level as the standards of conduct embodied by the community. Independent wants are those which are determined by internal attributes i.e desires which aren't consistent with a dependent want, and consequently not being strictly rational. The desire to move in higher social circles is itself an independent want; or the desire to be the funniest in a group of friends, and so on. Global independent wants are essentially local dependent wants, and local independent wants is a tautology.
Now, the indeterminacy of internal attributes is conducive to the claim that "anything that drives personality is sure to rest on things inarticulable," which is to say that the cycle of giving voice to desire is largely indeterminate, according to our law of indeterminacy. To make an attribute articulate is to give weight to a sense impression, thereby entailing that we can act upon it, according to the attribution of preference to any particular action, from which certain attributes may be assigned thereto. That is, if I want to be seen as indifferent, I may make certain preferences in my actions more explicit, or in any case features which can be assigned a particular quality or attribute, of which hopefully will align with my own view of indifference. This want can be compelled by any number of things, and arises from an indescribable internal attribute for which it will bleed into many of my actions.
Say I want to become an individual who has an affable personality. I can conceive of the logical step in pursuing this want, perhaps understanding that affability consists in proactively engaging in discussion, feigning certain attitudes, etc., all of which amount to the part of internal attributes influencing my behaviour; yet the indeterminacy of internal attributes means that our choice over what preferences we should develop, in conjunction with what attributes are assigned to us from independent observers, rests on the strength with which the desirability of a certain outcome has in our mind, which is ultimately determined by any number of inarticulable internal attributes, and thus outside of our control. The logical step is reasonable, yet it requires something that is not intrinsic to my nature, nor experience.
So, the building of independent wants, which forms of bolus of 'personality' in individuals, derives from previous non-trivial outcomes which indicate the amount of acceptance/stigmatization that arises from adopting certain sets of attributes. In other words, we can attempt to shape and articulate our personality according to global and local interests, so long as we produce effective outcomes which align with our own desires. But this seems circular: since these desires are essentially reducible to differences in internal attributes, which arise from what I described above, it seems that the shaping of internal attributes is dependent on global and local interests, and thus not a consequence of our own will.
Now the question that arises is whether or not we can be held culpable for our own actions, since if they are determined by an inarticulate web of internal attributes that derive in part from experience, how can we be said to have choice over our preferences? Well, we can simply state that our understanding of personality ought to be distinct from any moral system; we can hold certain moral positions, and offer great moralistic riposte to any amoral claim: yet this arises from a difference in internal attributes, and consequently the whole chief claim to moralism is made inarticulate, and hence functionally useless in practice. In any case, who attribution of an individual as 'moral' is enigmatic at best, offering up, not a moral distinction, but an observation of a form of conduct which aligns with an independent observer: and this observation must be rooted in their own moral ideas, or perhaps according to what they perceive as normative or anarchic in the world.
There can be seen some general agreement in Marx, as characterised by "false consciousness," a term not explicitly used by him but nonetheless held as indicative of his own thoughts, that the working class may develop cognitive confusions as concealment of social contradictions, and that these are inherited from the capitalistic system which works against their own interests. Now, the agreement consists in perpetuating unsound expectations, which we are all complicit in, in favour of social hegemony. In particular, I think this defines the differences between the sexes rather well; and we can lazily compound our discourse with terms like "social constructs," which may be true but sounds misleading. We are consigned to these constructs in the very same way that we are consigned to a particular system of law; the independence of judiciary and the ideal of law as a separation of powers is self-regulatory in a sense, and the same can be said of social constructs, which can be represented as global wants manifest from the locale of internal attributes.
I disagree in that wants can be so reductive; after all, to purport that individuals should work in interests intuitively best for them is to describe an inarticulable desire for people to act in a way according to your own internal attributes: that is, the idea that independent observers determine self-interest in favour of the working class seems to me wrong. In any case, we are not in a position to determine what interests are best for an individual, even if we recognize that their current interests, perhaps, are not the greatest.
There is certainly a lot that I missed and should in future like to work on. In particular, the nature of assigning reference seems to me an error or representing the act of assigning weight to thought. I may have certain ideas of how thoughts operate, though this could possibly be affirmed by my own distinct representation with which my mind gives weight; and this can be altered, of course, by semantic loopholes, which may form an incredulous (or false) idea of my own mind. But that's mere posturing, and thus has no place in the plane of effects.
To put a controversial spin on the topic: are incels really capable of developing socially desirable qualities? My answer seems to be NO, that manufacturing social desirable attributes can be attempted in practice, but never fully committed to as a consequence of the law of indeterminacy; the logical step in evolving or achieving 'ascension' is clear, but the ability to actually make that leap must rely on internal attributes. I'll end there, since I don't wish to make any moral distinction in matters of character.
TL;DR personality is deterministic, traits are indeterminate. I may have missed a lot, but the general premise is clear.
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